NIGERIAN : Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict

 

Nigeria’s Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict

Summary

Nigeria’s long-running “indigene-settler” conflict in and around Jos, Plateau State has escalated in recent years and may spread to other ethnically mixed regions of the country, heightening instability. Navigating such inter-communal fault lines is a common challenge for many African societies that requires looking past symptoms to address systemic drivers. In Nigeria, this will entail measures that directly mitigate violence as well as realize constitutional reform.

Highlights

• Nigeria’s statutory framework grants local officials the authority to extend or deny basic rights to citizens in their jurisdictions, thereby creating incentives for the politicization of ethnicity and escalating intercommunal violence.
• Ineffective state responses to repeated ethnic clashes have highlighted a lack of political will to address this violence.
• While currently concentrated in central Nigeria, the systemic drivers to identity conflict have the potential to spread elsewhere in the country and will require fundamental institutional reforms to resolve.

In extreme cases, rival communities may perceive that their security, perhaps their very survival, can be ensured only through control of state power. Conflict in such cases becomes virtually inevitable.
—“The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa,”

Communal clashes across ethnic and religious fault lines in and around the city of Jos in central Nigeria have claimed thousands of lives, displaced hundreds of thousands of others, and fostered a climate of instability throughout the surrounding region.

While large-scale violence has occurred periodically over the past decade, in recent years attacks have become more frequent, widespread, and efficient. Over 200 people were killed and nearly 100 more went missing during near daily attacks in January 2011. Many Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, 1998 victims were killed or seized by Muslim or Christian youth gangs at impromptu roadside checkpoints and taxi and bus stations, their bodies later found in nearby shallow graves.¹

Several major attacks in 2010 saw new, increasingly lethal tactics. During 4 days of fighting in January, up to 500 people were killed and some 18,000 displaced, many into neighboring states. Local organizations collected over 150 text messages circulated prior to the violence, revealing an orchestrated effort to stoke tensions. In March, a single attack left another 300 to 500 dead. In August, five men were arrested while attempting to smuggle rocket launchers, grenades, AK–47s, and large quantities of cash into Plateau State, of which Jos is the capital. On Christmas day, twin car bombs in Jos killed nearly 80 and wounded more than 100. Signaling a dangerous new turn to this conflict, the violent Islamist group Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the explosions. The group had previously only been active in northern Nigeria.

The conflict in Jos is often characterized as inter-religious or inter-ethnic, mainly between the Christian-dominated ethnic groups of the Anaguta, Afizere, and Berom, and the predominantly Muslim Hausa and Fulani groups. But, as is often the case with identity conflicts in Africa, these are socially constructed stereotypes that are manipulated to trigger and drive violence in Jos.² They veil deeper institutional factors within Nigerian law that are abused and exploited to deny citizens access to resources, basic rights, and participation in political processes— factors that, left unaddressed, have the potential to trigger violence across the country.

Government responses to the conflict are widely perceived as ineffective. At least 16 public commissions have been launched to examine the conflict and identify solutions, and many other studies have been conducted by independent groups. But there is little political will to act on these findings. Recommendations go largely unheeded. Nor have organizers and perpetrators of attacks been prosecuted. Federal and state governments have regularly worked at cross-purposes. While civil society groups have become increasingly engaged, this has had a polarizing effect in some cases.

Underlying Causes

Situated on the northern edge of the so-called middle belt in central Nigeria where the country’s predominantly Muslim northern half blends with the generally Christian south (see map), Jos is a relatively new city. It was established as a mining transportation camp in 1915 because of its proximity to nearby tin and columbite deposits. With a mild climate, high quality soil, abundant water resources, extensive grazing lands, and economic opportunities, it attracted migrants from around Nigeria and currently has a population of nearly 1 million. The city remains a key supplier and commercial center in the national livestock trade and is the site of the National Veterinary Research Institute. Before being destroyed during communal clashes in 2002, the Jos Central Market was one of West Africa’s biggest on account of its proximity to a high-traffic rail juncture between northern and southern Nigeria. The city’s diverse population once exemplified the Plateau State slogan, “the home of peace and tourism.” Schools were often intermixed, and business was conducted regardless of religious or ethnic affiliation.³

This began to change in the early 1990s following an adjustment in the distribution of indigeneship certificates. In Nigeria, indigenes are “original” inhabitants of a local government area, or members of those ethnic groups that trace their lineage back to the area. All others are considered “settlers,” or migrants. The distinction was initially intended to allay concerns among minority groups who feared that their traditional customs and authority structures would be overwhelmed and eroded by the expansion of larger ethnic and religious groups. However, in practice, the classification has often been used to determine who “belongs” to a particular locality, which in turn determines whether citizens can participate in politics, own land, obtain a job, or attend school.⁴ Accordingly, the indigeneship certificate is now a defining document in the day-today lives of many Nigerians.

Such differentiations are grounded in national law. The Nigerian constitution, adopted in 1999, and the Federal Character Commission, a statutory body established to ensure equity in the distribution of resources and political power in the country, recognize the validity of indigene certificates. These bodies also accept the authority of local officials to issue the certificates to constituents whom officials deem qualified—a practice that first originated in the 1960s. This authority dramatically elevates the importance of and competition over districting and local elections. Elected officials, in turn, have a strong incentive to use the certificates as a tool to consolidate local ethnic majorities. Indeed, many are accused of stirring tensions, supporting violent actors, and perpetuating the selective distribution of indigene certificates, including the Governor of Plateau State, Jonah Jang, whose political campaigns have seemed to vilify Muslims and certain Christian ethnic groups.⁵ This has resulted in sharp differences in intergroup inequality, intercommunal animosity, and social fragmentation.

Defining indigeneship is extraordinarily arbitrary. For instance, a Hausa, Igbo, or Yoruba—groups that tend not to be originally from Jos—could legally be deemed a settler and denied a certificate even though his family has lived in Jos for generations. Were this same individual to return to areas where his ethnic group predominates, local officials could similarly deny certificates on account of his birth and connections in Jos. Children of inter-ethnic and inter-religious parents face similar double-standards.

“The ethnic or religious dimensions of the conflict have subsequently been misconstrued as the primary driver of violence when, in fact, disenfranchisement, inequality, and other practical fears are the root causes.”

But for many years, this was not a problem. Certificates were generally easy to obtain for Plateau State residents and caused few concerns. However, during the late 1980s falling government revenues, increasing economic pressures, and steadily increasing migration to one of Nigeria’s fastest growing regions prompted some local authorities to revise indigene certificate policies. In 1990, several local jurisdictions in Plateau, including Jos, began to restrict the distribution of indigene certificates.⁶ Under Nigerian law, the modifications were perfectly legal, but the action seemed to deny indigeneship eligibility disproportionately to many Muslims and ethnic groups from northern Nigeria. These groups in turn lobbied for assistance from national authorities. In 1991, General Ibrahim Babangida, the (northern-born) military ruler of Nigeria, announced that Jos would be divided into three Local Government Areas (LGAs) in what many perceived as a thinly disguised effort to gerrymander the region in favor of his local allies who would then control certificate distribution. Some groups, particularly Christians, feared this decision was designed to exclude them from political office.

As uncertainty mounted over access to indigeneship certificates, community relations deteriorated. Yet violence did not immediately break out. Babangida’s successor as military ruler, General Sani Abacha, dissolved all democratic structures and in 1994 directly appointed military governors, who then selected local government officials. Abacha’s appointments prompted local protests and counterdemonstrations in Jos. Fears and tensions reached a breaking point, leading to the first violent communal clashes and deaths. Ever since, local elections and political appointments have been viewed as winner-take-all contests.

The ethnic or religious dimensions of the conflict have subsequently been misconstrued as the primary driver of violence when, in fact, disenfranchisement, inequality, and other practical fears are the real root causes. Capitalizing on such conditions, many political rivals have instrumentalized the ethnic and religious diversity of Jos to manipulate and mobilize support. Each outbreak of violence worsens suspicions and renders communal reconciliation more difficult, deepening the cycle and further incentivizing polarization. The heads of the Christian Association of Nigeria and the Nigerian National Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs issued a joint statement in 2010 denouncing local politicians in Jos for exploiting communal tensions for personal gain.⁷ A study commissioned by the Office of the President in 2003 similarly concluded that while ethnic plurality plays a role in the conflict, “underpinning these sources of antagonism and triggers are deeper systemic issues at the center of which is the relationship between political power and access to economic resources and opportunities.”⁸

“Since communal violence first emerged in 1994, few charges have been brought against perpetrators and no credible prosecutions have been pursued.”

Similar indigeneship tensions have emerged elsewhere in Nigeria. Reflecting a widespread concern over the potential expansion of these disputes, 20 Nigerian citizens filed a joint legal case in March 2011 against the federal and 16 state and local governments regarding discrimination on the basis of indigeneship.⁹ The plaintiffs argue they are being denied fundamental rights protected by the Nigerian constitution as well as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. All are long-time residents of the jurisdictions against which they are filing claims, some with family roots going back generations.

Indigeneship has also sparked deadly communal conflict in Kaduna State in northern Nigeria and the oil-rich southern Delta State. As in Plateau, these conflicts have been described as inter-religious or inter-ethnic, though the material ramifications of losing indigeneship are the real drivers of violence. The conflict in Jos, however, is more violent, likely as a result of how intensely indigeneship has been seized by political rivals to mobilize support in these closely divided jurisdictions. According to 2011 voter registries, the Christian-dominated ethnic groups made up approximately 200,000 while predominantly Muslim groups number roughly 150,000 out of 429,179 registered voters in Jos North LGA—the central district of the greater Jos area.

Governance Shortcomings Exacerbate Tensions

To deter attacks and protect the people in Jos, an already extensive national police presence has regularly been augmented by military deployments. Yet on multiple occasions security agencies have failed to prevent and respond to known threats and early signs of pending attacks. The worst outbreaks of communal clashes in 1994, 2001, 2004, 2008, and 2010 (see table) were typically preceded by days of simmering tensions and conspicuous mobilization. Prior to fighting that resulted in thousands of deaths in 2001, “everyone on the streets of the town sensed the tension and the threat of danger hanging heavily in the air long before the events. . . . Something dreadful was about to happen.”¹⁰ During incidents in 2010, separate attacks began and ended at roughly the same time on the same day, suggesting they were preplanned.¹¹

Prevention and response are further undermined by poor intergovernmental coordination and insufficient means of information-sharing. For instance, in March 2010, Plateau State Governor Jonah Jang informed the commanding officer of an armored division of the Nigerian army deployed to Jos of an impending attack on the Dogo Na Hawa village through text message. The governor later claimed a text was necessary as the officer refused to respond to his phone calls. A subsequent attack left more than 300 dead.

“A governance vacuum in Jos is worsening; increasingly fearful and suspicious communities are turning toward nonstate actors.”

Part of the problem is disconnected lines of authority. Police and the armed forces are centralized at the federal level, and all related security requests must be channeled to the national capital for consideration. This poses serious challenges for early response and management of internal security at the state and local levels. Following attacks, finger pointing and blame trading within the security sector and across the government are common. This is compounded by episodes in which some of the perpetrators of the ethnic violence are seen wearing military or police uniforms.

Justice and accountability have also been lacking. Since communal violence first emerged in 1994, few charges have been brought against perpetrators, and no credible prosecutions have been pursued.

The highly connected individuals and politicians involved in fomenting tensions are equally effective in using their influence to protect perpetrators of violence. With each passing incident of violence that results in few arrests and no prosecutions, citizens’ confidence in law enforcement, judicial institutions, and government, in general, diminish.

“The concept of indigeneship inherently divides Nigerians and undermines the democratic form of government that Nigeria aspires to uphold.”

While on-the-ground response has remained poor, government offices at the state and national levels have launched numerous studies of the violence in Jos, but with little effect. After one clash in 2008, five separate commissions of inquiry were announced. Yet few if any of the resulting policy prescriptions have been implemented. Some commission reports have never even been made public. Reflecting the growing impatience and diminishing expectations of many Nigerians, one newspaper editorial described such commissions as a “ritual of instituting inquiries and receiving reports that always end up in the archives.”¹² With their proliferation, these committees have lost credibility and been politicized. Recent commissions have been unable to obtain testimony from key sources and attract high-profile members. Some commissions have been overtly one-sided.

As a result, a governance vacuum in Jos is worsening. Increasingly fearful and suspicious communities are turning toward nonstate actors. Citizens rely almost entirely on these groups for protection, humanitarian assistance, and reintegration of displaced persons in the aftermath of conflicts, which further amplifies the polarization resulting from indigeneship disputes.

Some community organizations seem intent to hasten this polarization. Several faith-based organizations—Christian and Muslim alike—and many youth groups such as the Berom Youth Movement, Anaguta Youth Movement, Afizere Youth Movement, and the Jasawa Development Association have played key roles in spreading exclusionary ideologies and violence. In the absence of credible and accountable state authorities, their influence and appeal among citizens of Jos can only be expected to grow.

Mitigating Future Conflict in Plateau State

Entrenched institutional factors are at the heart of the accelerating distrust and violence in Plateau State. Left unchecked, this pattern is likely to expand to a growing number of Nigeria’s 36 states. Fundamental changes will be required to reverse the incentives feeding this violence.

Eliminate indigene/settler classifications in government decision making.

The legal basis for indigeneship in the Nigerian constitution and Federal Character Commission should be eliminated. Originally envisioned as a means to protect traditional customs, cultures, and governance structures, the notion of indigeneity has been warped and politicized. Today, it provides an institutionalized incentive for political opportunists to build power on the basis of exclusion. In Jos, it has led to thousands of deaths and severe intercommunal hostility. The concept of indigeneship inherently divides Nigerians and undermines the democratic form of government that Nigeria aspires to uphold. Indeed, it undercuts the very notion of what it means to be Nigerian.

Disentangling indigeneship from Nigerian law will be difficult. It will likely require amendments to the Nigerian constitution and other legal codes. To the extent such categories ever had value, in an increasingly mobile, modern, and urban society, they are now outdated. Likewise, increasingly popular halfmeasures should be dismissed. Clearer definitions of “indigenes” or supplemental “residency certificates” for so-called settlers will not eliminate the two-tiered notion of citizenship that the indigene/settler dichotomy perpetuates. Indigeneity should end or conflict in Jos is likely to worsen—as well as emerge in other Nigerian cities and states.

Strengthen, coordinate, and deconflict security institutions.

Strengthening security forces’ capacity to proactively detect early warning signs and respond to intercommunal tensions can help better contain outbreaks of violence. This will require a cohesive intelligence capability that can provide local and state law enforcement units with near-time information. At the same time, federal forces must remain engaged at the local level to protect minorities. However, clear lines of authority and means for coordination between the local, state, and federal levels need to be put into practice. Similarly, means for investigating allegations of security sector participation in ethnic violence are required to ensure accountability.

Progress in Lagos State could inspire innovative reforms in Plateau. Lagos established a state secsecurity trust fund that serves as a point of coordination between business and state officials to identify security threats and coordinate responses with police authorities. It also mobilizes funds and resources to support local policing. Helicopters, vehicles, and other advanced equipment have been purchased to enhance police effectiveness and incentivize quick response and information-sharing. Other policing initiatives in Lagos have successfully integrated some youth groups in community policing and monitoring efforts.

Make protection of minority rights a priority.

In order to reconcile Plateau’s polarized ethno-religious identity groups and build support for peacebuilding initiatives, all sides must have confidence that basic rights will be protected and that an institutionalized means to investigate alleged violations is available. This will require the engagement of a trusted, independent, external actor.

The National Human Rights Commission is positioned to play such a role. In March 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan signed into law amendments aimed at empowering the previously hamstrung commission. Its capacity, budget, and authority should now be expanded in order to fulfill this broader mandate. It would do well to emulate successes achieved by Ghana’s Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, which has contributed significantly to social reconciliation. This commission is wholly independent from, though collaborates with, the security services. This arrangement facilitates greater cooperation from citizens who are more inclined to report violations and abuses to the trusted human rights commission. Additionally, Nigeria’s human rights commission must have the authority to initiate and conduct investigations, issue subpoenas, access state and national leaders, pursue charges, and other prerogatives in order to cut through political stonewalling.

Such an expansive mandate will require the appointment of leaders with unquestionable integrity and insulation from political pressures. To foster this, leadership appointments should be subject to peer review from respected civil society entities such as the Nigerian Bar Association. Indeed, given that some politicians and politically connected individuals will likely be the subjects of investigations, the commission will need to remain consciously disentangled from politics.

Establish community-based, state-supported peacebuilding committees.

The Plateau State government, in collaboration with federal counterparts, should establish community-based interethnic and -religious peacebuilding committees to facilitate dialogue and implement conflict mitigation strategies.

The Plateau State government should model these committees on those in Kaduna State, where the government proactively involves the population in forums for dialogue such as the Committee on Inter-Religious Harmony chaired by the governor. The committee is designed to identify potential conflict flashpoints as well as devise steps to avert or resolve them. It also works to ensure the speedy repatriation, rehabilitation, and palliative compensation of displaced persons and monitors the flow of small arms.

Such a committee in Plateau could lay the foundation for sustainable stability by emphasizing reconciliation and fostering a climate of political inclusiveness. It could also bear immediate results by providing a means for government-community engagement and facilitating more timely interventions that can prevent localized incidents from escalating to large communal clashes. Over the long-term, such an initiative can help inculcate a shared sense of Nigerian identity.

Conclusion

In many respects, the spiraling insecurity in Jos is anything but a local communal conflict. Its root causes and impacts encapsulate many of Nigeria’s biggest political challenges. Unclear and discriminatory legal codes fuel conflict, warp political dynamics, and undermine democratic progress. Governance shortcomings create vacuums in which citizens are forced to turn to self-help solutions such as ethnic associations or vigilante groups. A modern economy conducive to local entrepreneurship and appealing to foreign investors remains impossible while the free flow of people, goods, and ideas is restricted by indigeneship and resulting instability. Resolving the conflict in Jos will require looking past the symptoms of Nigeria’s ethnic and religious divisions to focus on the institutionalized inequities that encumber not only stability in Plateau State but also progress in Nigeria as a whole.

Chris Kwaja is a Lecturer and Researcher in the Centre for Conflict Management at the University of Jos, Nigeria

BIAFRA : IPOB hoists Biafra flag in Akwa Ibom community, clashes with security

 

Security Sector Violence against Civilians

Police and military violence against civilians are a persistent impediment to sustainable peace in Nigeria. In 2020, nationwide #EndSARS protests, led by young people, transcended the country’s religious, ethnic, and political divides and demanded an end to police abuses, particularly the dissolution of the unaccountable Federal Special Anti-Robbery Squad (FSARS). This division of the national police force was originally set up to address the problem of organized criminal gangs across the country. Over time, however, FSARS became known for extorting Nigerian citizens and committing human rights abuses. In a vivid illustration of this, security forces opened fire on #EndSARS protesters in October 2020 to shut down marches and sit-downs across the country.

 

While FSARS has been in the spotlight recently, Nigeria’s State Security Service (SSS) has regularly harassed and detained journalists with impunity, including invading a courtroom to re-arrest a defendant whom the judge had ordered be set free. When protestors or fact-seekers get too close to the levers of power and privilege, it is often the SSS—directly overseen by the president—that intervenes. Another unit close to the executive—the Presidential Guard Brigade—was revealed to have shot and killed dozens of Shia marchers from the Iranian-backed Islamic Movement in Nigeria in Abuja in 2018. The protesters were demanding the release of their leader (who was still detained despite Nigerian courts ordering him freed).

A protest against the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Lagos. (Photo: TobiJamesCandids)

Many violent episodes between security forces and civilians take place in Nigeria’s cities. Nigerian security forces have frequently demolished urban neighborhoods and displaced vulnerable residents as a means of making way for upscale private developments. This creates insecurity for thousands of Nigerians and contributes to instability in the country’s cities. Many of these clearances are unannounced and illegal, but they go forward despite residents having long and legitimate tenancies and despite judges’ injunctions. Land deals and developments are at the center of organized criminal activities and corruption in Nigeria. As Nigeria’s cities continue to rapidly grow—they are now home to over half of the country’s 200 million citizens—low levels of trust in police and security forces are becoming a major challenge to building stable and resilient cities.

Need for Multi-Dimensional Responses

The diversity of Nigeria’s security threats will require an innovative set of solutions adapted to each context. This will entail understanding the local dynamics of each threat and integrating them into a multidimensional national security strategy.

As Nigeria’s challenges are largely domestic in nature, this national security strategy will require active citizen engagement. Citizen cooperation may be the most essential element of a successful response in each context. Yet, in nearly every instance, Nigeria’s security forces are starting from a deficit of trust. Indeed, security force violence against citizens is often viewed as part of the security problem. Remedying this and building trust with citizens will be a top and ongoing priority of any national security strategy.

“Citizen cooperation may be the most essential element of a successful response.”

The domestic nature of these threats also highlights the importance of an integrated security response that encompasses expanding access to government services, social development, and job creation.  Integrated security also entails widening access to justice. Accessible and trusted justice mechanisms can serve as a vehicle for conflict mitigation as well as defusing tensions between communities or with the government. Rulings by courts, in turn, must be respected and upheld by security actors. This review reveals, especially with regards to security sector violence against civilians, repeated instances of security services disregarding judicial rulings, thereby exacerbating social tensions and undermining the rule of law.

Another recurring challenge observed across multiple security contexts is the need to sustain a security presence in outlying areas. Nigerian security forces have repeatedly been able to clear militant groups from territory they’ve held – be it Boko Haram in the North East, criminal groups in the North West, or pirates and armed gangs in the South West or South South. However, the inability to sustain a security presence creates a security vacuum that has enabled these militant groups to regroup and revive their predatory activities. Communities that are caught up in the middle of these shifting security frontlines are left in a vulnerable position. For Nigeria to turn the corner vis-à-vis these militant groups, the government and security forces will need to be able to sustain an ongoing and accountable security presence in these contested regions.

Land management is another crosscutting issue shaping Nigeria’s security challenges. Currently, there are on average over 500 people per square mile living in Nigeria. The country’s population is projected to double to 400 million in the next 30 years, spiking its population density to levels currently seen in Israel and India. Already, many Nigerians are struggling to find sufficient resources and opportunities to imagine a secure future for themselves and their families. Nigeria recently surpassed India as home to the most people living in poverty in the world, and its unemployment rate is 33 percent. Reflecting the multidimensional nature of Nigeria’s security threats, negotiating access to land will be an increasingly critical factor in managing Nigeria’s security landscape moving forward.

Nigeria’s Diverse Security Threats

Nigeria faces an array of security challenges beyond Boko Haram. Distinguishing these threats and understanding their socio-geographic contours is essential for adapting customized solutions.

Note: map reflects the geographic concentration of threats, not the magnitude of each threat. Composite data from 2018-2021.

Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari has said Nigeria is facing “a state of emergency” as a result of ongoing insecurity. This emergency is commonly understood as the threat posed by Boko Haram in the country’s northeast. However, this understates the complexity and multidimensional nature of Nigeria’s security challenges, which impact all of the country’s regions. At the same time, armed violence is not omnipresent across Nigeria and is primarily concentrated in specific geographic corridors. Following is a review of Nigeria’s diverse security threats, the risks they pose, and the landscapes in which they have germinated.

 

Militant Islamist Groups

Boko Haram and its offshoot the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) continue to be Nigeria’s most serious security threats. Violent events linked to these groups have roughly doubled since 2015, when the government launched a major offensive dislodging these groups from the territory they held. Since retreating from urban centers during that 2015 offensive, the groups have focused their operations on the more desolate areas of Borno State—primarily in the rugged Sambisa Forest bordering Cameroon’s northwest mountains (Boko Haram) and the firki (“black cotton”) wetlands south and southwest of Lake Chad (ISWA).

From these secluded “hideouts,” the groups have mounted a series of agile attacks and cross-border raids on towns and villages. This has been accompanied by a strategy of isolating the state capital, Maiduguri, through a series of highway attacks. By planting landmines, establishing permanent checkpoints, sabotaging the power grid, and attacking highway travelers, Boko Haram and ISWA have effectively cut Borno off from the rest of Nigeria. These militant groups derive significant income and military supplies from robberies and kidnappings carried out on the state’s highways. This siege has inhibited food production and transportation and contributed to food prices spiking 50 percent across Borno.

Nigerian soldiers near the Sambisa Forest.      (Photo: VOA/Hussaina Muhammad)

In its pursuit of these militants, the military has been accused of razing rather than protecting some civilian villages. As a result, Borno State residents often feel caught between Islamist militants and the Nigerian army and are accused by both of being collaborators with the other side.

The Nigerian military’s withdrawal to “super camps” in 2019 has given Boko Haram and ISWA freer range to move through the region’s hinterlands. At times, these fortified garrison towns have themselves become vulnerable to large-scale attacks. Caches of arms, ammunition, and vehicles are often the target of raids on military installations. Many of these stockpile losses are not tracked, making it more difficult to establish the groups’ capabilities.

Cross-border mobility is a trademark of how Boko Haram and ISWA exploit the region’s harsh and seasonally shifting landscape and elude capture. From the Sambisa Forest, Boko Haram fighters have crossed into Cameroon to carry out raids and suicide attacks in the far north where there is a limited Cameroonian military presence. As Lake Chad swells during the rainy season, militants move by speedboat through its floodwaters and surrounding swamps to control and exploit the lucrative smoked fish and red pepper trade. Boko Haram and ISWA also increase raids and attacks during the end-of-year rainy season when military vehicles are bogged down and the Air Force has less visibility due to vegetation.

Outside of the North East region, attacks by militant Islamist groups are currently rare. Boko Haram has attempted to claim recent mass kidnappings in the North West conducted by armed gangs, likely in order to appear more expansive. However, a previously disabled group known as Ansaru (which broke off from Boko Haram in 2012) has been staging a small number of sophisticated attacks in the North West states of Kaduna and Katsina. This group is believed to have mobilized local grievances experienced by Fulani herders to recruit them under an ideological banner.

Organized Criminal Gangs

Exploiting a security vacuum, criminal gangs in North West Nigeria have been behind a surge of kidnappings for ransom targeting boarding schools. In the last five years, the North West has experienced the greatest concentration of kidnappings in Nigeria. The ransoms collected through these mass abductions have become a means of business for these criminal gangs. Mass kidnappings in Zamfara, Niger, and Katsina states have emulated 2014’s infamous kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls by Boko Haram and have forced the government to respond. Government spokespeople deny paying ransom to secure the release of the children, but on-the-ground accounts contradict this. Moreover, government officials may benefit from the large amounts of cash used to secure hostages’ release. As in the North East, kidnapping for ransom has made highways in the region too dangerous for travel, and airlines now operate short flights from Abuja to Kaduna.

In Zamfara State, where the North West’s armed gang problem originated, rival groups raid and clash over the artisanal gold mines that have proliferated in the past decade. The gangs’ control of the state’s gold rush has attracted many impoverished and unemployed young men to join their ranks. These gangs are known to hideout in the Sububu and Dansadau forests in Zamfara and to smuggle arms across the border from Niger. Zamfara’s government has estimated that 10,000 so-called bandits are spread between 40 camps in the state.

Further east and south, gangs in Katsina and Kaduna stage cattle raids and abductions from the Davin Rugu forest. Raids on farmers and pastoralists from these forest camps exacerbate the existing tensions between communal groups and spur the demand for guns in the region, which the armed gangs then supply—further deteriorating security.

The activities of these organized gangs in the North West is attracting the attention of militant Islamist groups. Ansaru has deployed clerics to the region to preach against democracy and government peace efforts. There is also some evidence that ISWA is developing ties to North West criminal groups in an attempt to radicalize them.

 

Farmer-Herder Conflict

Primarily affecting the Middle Belt and North West states, clashes between farmers and herders over land have spurred the formation of ethnic militias, vigilante raids, and extrajudicial killings.

Historically, the North West and Middle Belt states have been the fertile plains and grazing lands of Nigeria where nomadic pastoralist and sedentary agriculturalist groups coexisted, traded, and turned to local peacekeeping mechanisms when land disputes arose. However, desiccation and large land allocations to estate owners in the North West have pushed herders off their historical grazing routes. Likewise, according to aerial analysis by the U.S. Geological Survey, land available for open grazing in Nigeria’s Middle Belt declined by 38 percent between 1975 and 2013, while the area dedicated to farming nearly trebled. These dynamics have been driven by climate shifts, exclusionary land policies, and population growth. Meanwhile, demand for meat supplied by the country’s herders is rising.

“Despite this frequent framing in communal terms, religion and regional affiliation are not primary drivers of conflict.”

This central swath of Nigeria is also where the northern socio-political zone of the country meets the southern zone. This is a region of cultural exchange where dozens of languages are spoken and where no individual group has a clear political majority—national election margins are the closest in Middle Belt states. National politicians, large land holders, and their allies in the press have seized on these dynamics to politicize clashes between farmers and herders and between so-called “settlers” and “indigenous” communities in the region. Conspiracy theories and claims of coverups and ethnic cleansing around violence in the Middle Belt are common—and recycled even by well-meaning humanitarian groups and analysts. Despite this frequent framing in communal terms, religion and regional affiliation are not primary drivers of conflict. This is demonstrated by the fact that Islam-practicing Fulani and Hausa militias are often adversaries in these communal clashes, especially in the North West.

The politicization of communal violence in Nigeria risks expanding the scope of ethnically organized militias. Already, violence between herding and farming communities is beginning to occur in states south of the Middle Belt. In places like Ibadan (Oyo State) and Isuikwuato (Abia State), negative Fulani sentiment that southern Nigerian politicians and news outlets have generated around the Middle Belt violence is being used by ambitious individuals to incite anti-Fulani protests and attacks by armed youth groups.

 

Militant Biafran Separatists

Revived Biafran secessionist activities have escalated in recent years, leading to violent clashes between Nigeria’s security forces and militia groups resulting in dozens of deaths. Well known for its underground radio presence in the South East, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) established what it calls the Eastern Security Network (ESN) in December 2020 to act as a paramilitary force in the region. Based on their rhetoric and goals broadcast on social media, this group seems more focused on mobilizing grievances against Fulani herders than advocating for autonomy in the region. ESN has declared that it will enforce a ban on grazing in the South East, stoking anti-Fulani sentiment. Nigerian courts have upheld IPOB’s designation as a terrorist group.

Nigerian security forces and ESN have clashed in a series of skirmishes in 2021 that have resulted in the deaths of several civilians in what has become known as the Orlu crisis. ESN has inflamed tensions by killing police officers at checkpoints in several locations in the South East. These back-and-forth raids and attacks risk plunging the region into a crisis similar to the Anglophone-Francophone conflict across the border in southwest Cameroon.

Asari Dokubo, the former leader of the Niger Delta Peoples Salvation Front, announced the formation of a Biafra Customary Government in 2021. Dokubo is now aligned with the militant separatist group, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), as part of an apparent rivalry with IPOB. These developments portend increasing tensions with Nigerian security forces in the South East.

“Most pro-Biafra groups in the South East region are committed to nonviolence.”

South East Nigeria is still haunted by the memories of the country’s civil war (1967-70), when over a million people, including many civilians, died. This brutal conflict has had enduring ramifications for the region and the Nigerian state. To many Igbo people, whose parents and grandparents were part of the struggle for Biafra, the land in the South East is hallowed and still worth agitating for fuller control. However, most pro-Biafra groups in the South East region are committed to nonviolence and champion the cause of greater autonomy by peacefully protesting corruption, neglect, and arbitrary violence on the part of the Nigerian federal government. Despite disinformation produced by militant secessionists claiming that a return to civil war is imminent, the crisis is not nearly on the same scale as it was in the 1960s.

Human rights groups have documented Nigerian military and police using excessive force against pro-Biafran protestors, including killing 150 IPOB supporters and members in 2015 and 2016. On the 49^th anniversary of the declaration of Biafran independence, in 2016, security teams that included members of the military opened fire on a parade in Onitsha, killing at least 60 people. Violence against civilians by Nigeria’s security forces has contributed to motivating young men in the region to join the militant groups.

 

Piracy

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is now the worst in the world, accounting for over 95 percent of crew members kidnapped. There were 35 recorded piracy events off the coast of Nigeria in 2020. These figures likely only represent a fraction of the incidents, given that ship owners have incentives to downplay the risk to avoid increasing insurance premiums. The groups behind these attacks are shadowy, but a number of pirate enterprises are known to be connected to the armed groups that have for decades sabotaged pipelines and kidnapped oil workers in Nigeria’s Delta (South South and South East regions). Groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) have been difficult to address through security operations alone due their decentralized and leaderless structures, local support, and their tactics of striking quickly and disappearing into the region’s riverine labyrinth. Equipped with arms and speedboats and countered by oil companies spending millions of dollars on private security to protect oil infrastructure, some of these groups have begun venturing out of their swampland hideouts to board international ships in the Gulf of Guinea before retreating to their coastal bases with kidnapped crew members to negotiate ransoms paid from abroad.

Historically, groups in the Niger Delta have claimed to be motivated by the actions of multinational oil companies, which have polluted and impoverished the region. There is a lineage of righteous anger in the Niger Delta over this situation that has been voiced by likes of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni people. Many fishers and farmers in the region have had their livelihoods destroyed by contaminated land and water. Moreover, recent court rulings have declared that oil companies are responsible for the environmental degradation.

Today, however, profit from kidnappings appears to be the primary motivation for the piracy branching out into the Gulf. Declining oil prices also meant that kidnapping became more lucrative than siphoning crude oil from pipelines.

Some of the outlawed IPOB members have reportedly clashed with security operatives in Akwa Ibom state - In fact, they are said to have hoisted a Biafra flag in a community in the state - Meanwhile, the police are yet to confirm the attack on their operatives PAY ATTENTION: Join Legit.ng Telegram channel! Never miss important updates! Tension is brewing in Ikot Akpan community in Essien Udim local government area of Akwa Ibom state as gunmen suspected to be members of the Indigenous People of Biafra on Monday clashed with security operatives in the state. It was gathered that during the clash, IPOB members repelled the security operatives and hoisted a Biafra flag in the community The PUNCH further learnt that the palace of the village head of the community was torched and security vehicles destroyed during the clash which lasted several hours. Read more: https://www.legit.ng/1409688-ipob-hoists-biafra-flag-akwa-ibom-community-clashes-security-operatives.html

Some of the outlawed IPOB members have reportedly clashed with security operatives in Akwa Ibom state - In fact, they are said to have hoisted a Biafra flag in a community in the state - Meanwhile, the police are yet to confirm the attack on their operatives PAY ATTENTION: Join Legit.ng Telegram channel! Never miss important updates! Tension is brewing in Ikot Akpan community in Essien Udim local government area of Akwa Ibom state as gunmen suspected to be members of the Indigenous People of Biafra on Monday clashed with security operatives in the state. It was gathered that during the clash, IPOB members repelled the security operatives and hoisted a Biafra flag in the community The PUNCH further learnt that the palace of the village head of the community was torched and security vehicles destroyed during the clash which lasted several hours. Read more: https://www.legit.ng/1409688-ipob-hoists-biafra-flag-akwa-ibom-community-clashes-security-operatives.html

Oduduwa security outfit launched in Ogun as youths storm Alake’s palace [Video]

 

As part of efforts towards actualising their agitation for the acclaimed Oduduwa Republic, a security outfit has been launched in Abeokuta, the Ogun State capital.

The security outfit named Oduduwa Nation Security Force, was code-named “Operation Paramole’.

 reports that a set of Yoruba nation agitators suddenly appeared in Abeokuta on Tuesday for a rally.

With branded vehicles, T-shirts and banners, they marched to the palace of the Alake of Egbaland, Oba Adedotun Aremu Gbadebo.

However, the monarch was said to have travelled out of the State for a presentation at the Senate in Abuja.

Recall that Sunday Igboho’s spokesperson, Olayomi Koiki, had recently threatened that Yoruba youths would invade the palace of the Alake for not supporting Sunday Igboho’s call for a Yoruba nation.

But, Tuesday’s march to the Oba’s palace was a peaceful demonstration devoid of any act of violence.

“Yoruba Nation Warriors Ogun State Chapter. This is the first batch from Ogun State,” it posted on Twitter.

Yoruba Nation Awareness Campaign.

Abeokuta Ogun State. pic.twitter.com/JszPUMdiVB

Yoruba Nation (@OdudwaRepublic) March 30, 2021

Entertainment, Where Do Chris Tucker And Jackie Chan Stand Today

 

The two hilarious actors are investigating more opportunities to uphold their infamous stances in the entertainment industry.

Wondering what your favorite comedic detectives are up to now? Let's find out!

Chris Tucker and Jackie Chan started their careers off very differently, but ultimately carried out a pretty equivalent amount of success. Both landing roles in a now famously funny action movie, it's no secret that these two stars went on to slay the comedic entertainment industry and more.

Chris Tucker started out as a stand-up comedian in the 1990s. After his comedic success took off, he started to act in several movies. His big debut was landing the role of Detective James Carter in Rush Hour (1998), starring alongside Jackie Chan. It was this movie that ultimately changed Tucker’s life.

The movie is an action comedy about two contrasting detectives who set out to find a Chinese diplomat’s kidnapped daughter. It hit the screens in 1998, grossing over 200 million dollars worldwide, according to IMDb. It went on to carry out two sequels, Rush Hour 2 and 3 

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 According to Celebrity Net Worth, Tucker earned over 50 million dollars from the Rush Hour franchise.

After Tucker’s successful run in the Rush Hour franchise, becoming a millionaire, and finding a new spiritual path as a Christian, he decided to be more selective about the roles he would play. He only returned in a few small roles, appearing in movies like, Silver Linings Playbook (2012), Billy Lynn’s Long Halftime Walk (2016), and a few T.V. specials like, Jimmy Kimmel Live in 2019, where he spoke about an unsuccessful comedy club project.

During this time, Tucker ran into some financial struggles that tampered with his acting earnings. Neglecting to pay taxes properly, despite having the money, he fell in major debt with the IRS. Tucker went from earning 50 million dollars to having a net worth that was in the negatives, due to these financial endeavors.

 

His financial troubles were finally resolved in 2014, and he now has a reported net worth of about 7 million dollars, due to small acting and comedy gigs.

Jackie Chan, the infamous Hong Kong martial arts actor kickstarted his career as a stuntman in two Bruce Lee films, Fist of Furry (1972) and Enter the Dragon (1973). He then landed a starring role in a limited released film in Hong Kong. His career took off and eventually took him to America’s entertainment industry in Hollywood, CA. His first American film was the Big Brawl (1980), a martial arts film set in Chicago.

Rush Hour was one of Chan’s first big breaks in Hollywood. The movie shed much light on Chan’s comedic attributes as well as his collective demeanor. However, according to Indie Wire, Chan actually disliked the Rush Hour series the most, out of all his acting projects, despite its wild success. Although he did not earn as much as Chris Tucker, who negotiated his pay, for his work on the Rush Hour franchise, he still earned a whopping 40 million dollars. Clearly this worked out well for the beloved actor, as he went on to do many more popular projects like Karate Kid (2010), The Spy Next Door (2010), The Foreigner (2017), and many more. 

Throughout his career, he has earned a net worth of about 400 million dollars, as of 2021, according to Celebrity Net Worth.

Also being more selective about his roles these days, Chan has recently done less and less American films and has gone back to doing more Chinese films. It is in this industry that he feels he is most successful. According to Looper, Chan stated that if the right script comes along, he will jump at the chance.

As of right now, Chan is working on an all new movie called Vanguard. Set to release this year, it is about an accountant struggling for survival after being targeted by dangerous mercenaries. This is a very exciting installment in Chan’s career and will hopefully be exactly what Chan was looking for.

 

Both Chris Tucker and Jackie Chan were wildly successful actors, kicking it off with the first movie of the Rush Hour series. Tucker was once the highest paid actor, and Chan started out as an extra in Hong Kong. Reaping the financial benefits of their wild success, Chan is still a world-renowned action comedy actor, and Tucker is earning back his net worth through comedy gigs and small acting projects.

The two hilarious actors are investigating more opportunities to uphold their infamous stances in the entertainment industry.

UNICEF fund aims to raise US$2.5 billion for COVID-19 health supplies; low- and middle-income countries set to benefit

 

UNICEF has launched a fund to support low- and middle-income countries access to COVID-19 health supplies, including vital tests, treatments and vaccines. The fund, which leverages UNICEF’s Procurement Services to purchase supplies, provides an opportunity for donors to join the largest health and vaccines supply operation the world has ever seen.

The Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator Supplies Financing Facility (“ACT-A SFF”) aims to initially raise US$2.5 billion by the end of 2021. Of this, US$1 billion is intended for vaccines and associated immunization campaign supplies including those not covered financially by the COVAX Facility, such as AMC92 country cost-sharing doses through COVAX and support for self-financing participants’ vaccine and delivery costs. Another US$1 billion is for diagnostics and US$500 million is for therapeutics.

Contributions to the facility will help bring the world closer to the global ACT-A goal of providing low- and middle-income countries with the health supplies they need to help bring the acute phase of the pandemic to an end.

“An undertaking of this magnitude requires immediate support, which is why UNICEF has established the ACT-A Supplies Financing Facility,” said Etleva Kadilli, Director of UNICEF Supply Division. “The facility serves as one of the most efficient and most impactful vehicles for supporting the global COVID-19 response by making targeted interventions to get supplies to where they are needed at competitive prices.”

The Government of Denmark has contributed to the fund with a donation of US$4.8 million for immunization supplies to be used in Africa. These supplies will include cold chain and personal protective equipment (PPE) that are essential for carrying out safe COVID-19 immunization campaigns.

”Denmark’s contribution to UNICEF is a testimony to our strong support to the world’s poorest countries in the face of the pandemic. We need effective partnerships and global solidarity to overcome the biggest logistical challenge the world has ever seen. Denmark is proud to partner with UNICEF to accelerate free and fair distribution of COVID-19 vaccines and supplies to low-income countries,” said Flemming Møller Mortensen, Denmark’s Minister for Development Cooperation.

“We are grateful to the Government of Denmark for this generous and timely contribution. This support ensures UNICEF can continue to procure and deliver crucial supplies to countries in Africa so their health systems and the communities who depend on them are protected,” added Kadilli.

Since April 2020, the ACT-A partnership has supported the fastest, most coordinated and successful global effort in history to develop tools to fight a disease. UNICEF, as a key partner in ACT-A, is leading on the procurement and delivery of COVID-19 vaccines for around 100 countries on behalf of COVAX. UNICEF is also working to procure and deliver much-needed therapeutics and diagnostics, as well as supporting country preparedness efforts for the vaccine roll-out and strengthening of health systems.

The launch of the SFF also complements UNICEF’s efforts to accelerate access to lifesaving supplies, including vaccines and other non-immunization commodities, through its Vaccine Independence Initiative (“VII”) financial mechanism. In 2020, VII supplied hundreds of millions of doses of vaccines for non-COVID-19 immunizations, as well as millions of gloves, masks and medical supplies, as well as other essential commodities.

Rivers APC crisis. Call Amaechi to order or risk repeat of 2019 – Abe cautions party

 

Senator Magnus Abe has disagreed with an alleged comment by the Minister of Transportation Rotimi Amaechi that the 2023 governorship position of the All Progressives Congress in Rivers State has been zoned to Riverine areas.

Abe, who addressed his supporters in Port Harcourt, said he was happy when the leader of APC in the state in one of his functions said there will be no imposition of candidates but was worried when he allegedly turned around in a function Ogu Bolo area that he has asked Riverine People to nominate governor ahead of 2023 general elections.

He urged his supporters to see Amaechi’s comment as a personal opinion, warning that if the party continues with the same way it went before 2019 general elections, the unfortunate incident that happened against APC in the state may repeat itself.

“You have made a statement in the history of Nigeria Politics that nobody can easily erase. The last move that they made did it work? It did not work because you said the issues in the party must be addressed. Nobody can deny the sacrifices we all made to birth the APC in Rivers State.

“After the Supreme Court judgement we issued a statement. The statement was bastardized all over the social media, people came out to say all sorts of things, they said I said I had given up politics, I had been retired, I will be irrelevant to the politics of Rivers State. It is not possible? Nobody, can achieve that in Rivers State because politics is about people.

“I expected other leaders in the party to reciprocate in a manner that will open a window of opportunity, peace and reconciliation in the party. I didn’t hear that but I held my peace and I continued to insist that there must be peace for this party to move forward. A few days later, I started hearing some very very positive comments from the Minister of Transportation (Amaechi). When he went to Gokana he said there will be no imposition in the party and that party members will be allowed to choose a candidate for themselves.

“That noise continued for a few days, but a few days ago, I saw a video clip of the same man in Ogu-Bolo announcing that they should go and prepare for a Riverine governor and that the governorship has been zoned to Ogu-Bolo, Andoni, Opobo-Nkoro, Asari Toru, Akuku Toru, Degema and I said is that a sign of change? It is not. Let me say it here, loud and clear, that what the minister expressed in Ogu-Bolo is his personal opinion, he does not speak for all of us in the APC. When you want to zone, there must be a process, there must be consultation, the people that are being zoned in must understand why they are being zoned in and the people that are being zoned out, must understand why they are being zoned out.

“If you just stand, carry a microphone and begin to zone to unzone and unzone to zone, everybody knows what you are doing and I want to stand here and say it will not work. If that was an attempt to set the Riverine people against the rest of the state, I want to stand here to say that the Riverine people that I know are smarter than those who are trying to use them. It is a poisoned chalice, it is a Greek gift, it will get you nothing because it is not well-intended and it is not well intentioned.

“The former governor of Rivers State, Honourable Chibuike Rotimi Amaechi does not have that power as far as Rivers State is concerned. I want to say emphatically that Rt Hon. Chibuike Rotimi Amaechi was my boss and I respect him and I have always respected him but I was not his staff and I am not his employee, we were both employees of Rivers State Government.

“How can anybody get up in a party where we are to do registration, we have not even concluded the registration, we have not chosen one ward chairman, we have not chosen one ward ex-official, we have not chosen a local government chairman, we have not elected the chairman of the party in the state and even before we do any of that, somebody has come out to zone governorship in the party. Is that a sensible political action?

“It is time for you to put away that anger, put away that annoyance, go back, let us go back to our different wards and units and begin the important process of rebuilding this party, don’t mind what they are doing, ignore them completely because everybody who is a politician can tell between serious politics and grandstanding gamemanship.Grandstanding and game-manship will lead us to nowhere.

“Those issues must be address within this party, and there would be consequences if they are not addressed, don’t let anything phase you, don’t be afraid, be resolute, be firm you understand, and stay committed, justice will be done.

“I say it boldly that this battle is about justice in the APC in Rivers State and no amount of lies, no amount of propaganda, no amount of intimidation, no amount of power is going to make us give up our battle for justice and fairness within this party,” Abe said.

 

CSP, military officers, others killed by hoodlums in Akpabio LG, Essien Udim

 

 

Tension has continued to rise in Akpabio own Local Government, Essien Udim, Akwa Ibom State as some hoodlums attacked police operational vehicles and the military who were on patrol of the area.

 gathered that the gunmen numbering about 50 who were protesting against the Local Government Chairman attacked the police and military men mobilized to the local government for peace-keeping.

A police source told  that one CSP Benedict Okoh Ajide who led the squad to the LG fell to the bullets of the hoodlums while the driver of the hilux van was burnt alongside the vehicle.

According to the source, many military men were killed in the failed operation, even as many police officers are still missing as at the time of filing this report.

Details shortly…