The
1967–70 Nigerian Civil War (also known as the ‘Biafran War’) was
notorious for the prolonged
suffering of the civilian population in the
secessionist enclave of ‘Biafra’ and the failure of repeated
international attempts to bring about an early end to the conflict. At
the time the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ was used to denote the
international emergency relief operation, rather than a military
intervention — which is how the term has subsequently come to be used.
Ironically this humanitarian relief operation may have contributed to
the prolongation of the war and thereby added to the human suffering. In
this chapter, based partly on my experience working on the ground in
this conflict, I argue
that other forms of intervention, which could
just as reasonably be described as ‘humanitarian’, were neglected by the
principal international actors engaged with the conflict. I compare
this state of affairs with subsequent approaches to intervention in
Africa and elsewhere and conclude by suggesting that the lessons from
‘Biafra’ could be used to inform a more enlightened approach to
‘humanitarian intervention’ in present-day crises.
Keywords
The Nigerian Civil War and‘Humanitarian Intervention’
Michael AaronsonIntroductionThe 1967–70 Nigerian Civil War (also known as the ‘Biafran War’) wasnotorious for the prolonged suffering of the civilian population in thesecessionist enclave of ‘Biafra’ and the failure of repeated internationalattempts to bring about an early end to the conflict. At the time the
term‘humanitarian intervention’ was used to denote the international emer-gency relief operation, rather than a military intervention – which ishow the term has subsequently come to be used. Ironically this human-itarian
relief operation may have contributed to the prolongation ofthe war and thereby added to the human suffering.
In this chapter,based partly on my experience working on the ground in this conflict,I argue that other forms of intervention, which could just as reasonablybe described as ‘humanitarian’, were neglected by the principal inter-national actors engaged with the conflict. I compare this state of affairswith subsequent approaches to
intervention in Africa and elsewhere andconclude by suggesting that the lessons from ‘Biafra’ could be used toinform a more enlightened approach to ‘humanitarian intervention’ inpresent-day crises.BackgroundAt the time of Biafran secession the Federal Republic of Nigeria consistedof four regions: northern, western, mid-
western and eastern. Since pre-independence days Nigerian politics had been dominated by ethnicrivalries across and within these regional groups. The war began on30 May 1967 when, following a long period of political crisis acrossthe country, including military coup and counter coup and reprisa
killings of mainly Igbo civilians originating from the Eastern Region, ColOjukwu, the region’s governor, declared secession and the establishmentof the ‘Republic of Biafra’. The Federal Government of Nigeria
(FGN)which had already imposed an economic blockade of ‘Biafra’, respondedby launching an armed attack against ‘the rebels’. Despite a number ofinternationally supported initiatives to bring an end to the conflict,
itdragged on for 30 months. Although the Nigerian armed forces enjoyedoverwhelming military superiority the Biafrans succeeded in prolong-ing the fighting – as much by political as military means. The resultwas a long, slow, inefficient war of attrition, which the internationalcommunity appeared powerless to end. The most
salient feature of thewar was a massive and controversial international relief operation tosupport the civilia
n victims of the conflict – on both sides, but mainlyinside Biafra. Despite this, by the time of Biafra’s surrender
on 12 January1970, an estimated 600,000 people – the vast majority of them civilians –had died.1From August 1969 until October 1971 I worked in Eastern Nigeria asa member of Save the Children UK’s2international
relief and rehabili-tation programme. I was, therefore, a participant in the ‘humanitarianintervention’ that took place. At the time we were in no doubt what theterm ‘humanitarian’ meant: it signified that we were motivated solelyby a concern to bring relief to the civilian victims of the conflict, asidefrom any political or other
objectives. As this perception was shared byboth parties to the conflict it meant we were able to act relatively freelyand independently, within the constraints of working in a war zone.We organized food distributions to rural communities that had spentup to two months hiding in the ‘bush’ because they feared genocideby the
advancing Nigerian Army and who were, when they were even-tually persuaded to emerge, in very poor condition indeed. We ranintensive feeding programmes for the most severely malnourished chil-dren and
organized emergency sick bays to treat the most seriouslyill.3We could reasonably claim to have saved many lives and, perhapsunsurprisingly, I acquired a passionate belief in humanitarian values andthe importance of neutral, independent, humanitarian action.From 1988 to 2005 I worked again for Save the Children UK, firstas
overseas director and then as the charity’s chief executive. Duringthis period ‘humanitarianism’ became a more contested concept and‘humanitarians’ lost some of their self-confidence, for a variety of rea-sons that I shall explore later in this chapter. This was reflected in thefact that the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ came to be used by politi-cians and scholars alike to denote military intervention for ostensibly
Notes
1.
John De St Jorre,
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John Stremlau,
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